volume	13,	no.	1 january	2013 How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? Brent G. Kyle United States Air Force Academy © 2013 Brent	G.	Kyle This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/013001/> I. Introduction. Many influential ethicists of the twentieth century turned their attention to thick concepts, like courageous, dishonest, and generous (Murdoch	1971;	Foot	1958;	Hursthouse	1995).	Some	ethicists	even	urged us	to	stop	focusing	as	much	on	thin	concepts,	like	good	and	wrong,	and to	expand	or shift	our	attention towards the thick (Anscombe	1958; Williams	1985;	Lovibond	1983;	Platts	1979).	But	what	is	the	supposed significance of thick concepts? Very briefly, thick concepts are said to combine descriptive and evaluative elements and have thereby provided	focal	points	for	a	cluster	of	related	issues,	such	as	whether there	is	a	fact-value	gap,	whether	evaluative	language	is	truth-apt,	and whether	the	evaluative	can	be	reduced	to	the	descriptive. But	critics	have	responded	by	downplaying	the	importance	of	thick concepts within ethics, and they've done so by arguing that thick concepts	are	not	genuinely	evaluative	(Brower	1988)	or,	similarly,	that thick terms do not express evaluative meanings (Blackburn 1992). Simon	Blackburn, for	example,	has	declared that thick terms	"are	of no	great importance	to the	theory	of	ethics",	and	he	has	done	so	by arguing	that	such	terms	do	not	have	evaluative	meanings	(1992,	285). Contrary to this	skepticism, I shall	argue that thick terms indeed have	evaluative	meanings (section II). I call this the	Semantic	View. Proponents of this view have provided very little argumentative support in its favor. But an argument is certainly	needed, since the Semantic View is by no	means obvious and has been attacked on many	occasions	(e. g.,	Blackburn	1992;	Brower	1988;	Väyrynen	2009). Although space prohibits discussion of all of these attacks, I shall defend	the	Semantic	View	against	Pekka	Väyrynen's	recent	challenge arising	from	objectionable	thick	concepts	(section	III). What	exactly	is	at	issue	between	those	who	affirm	and	those	who deny	the	Semantic	View?	Most	ethicists	are	willing	to	grant	that	thick terms are somehow associated with evaluations, but they tend to disagree	about	what	exactly	this	relationship	is.	The	issue	for	debate is	not	whether	but	how	thick	terms	are	associated	with	evaluations.	For example,	is	a	thick	term's	evaluation	pragmatically	associated	with	it? ImprintPhilosophers' brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) In the next section, I advance	my positive argument for this claim. The	parenthetical	qualification	within	the	Semantic	View-i. e.,	"Many thick	concepts	(if	not	all)..."-will	be	explained	in	due	course	(section II.5).	In	section	III,	I	take	up	the	issue	of	objectionable	thick	concepts. II. An Argument for the Semantic View. II.1 Good and Bad in a Way My argument for the Semantic View is an inference to the best explanation	of	certain linguistic	data.	After	presenting this	data (II.1 and	II.2),	I	propose	an	instance	of	the	Semantic	View	as	my	favored explanation (II.3) and then proceed to reject various alternative explanations	of	that	data	(II.4). The	linguistic	data	in	question	crucially	involves	two	thin	evaluative concepts	-	namely	the	concepts	good in a way	and	bad in a way.	These concepts are often employed in ordinary conversation. Suppose you're	ultimately	against	the	new	health	care	bill,	but	you	nonetheless believe	it	has	certain	merits.	In	this	case,	you	might	defend	it	against an	uncharitable	attack	by	saying You're	right	that	the	bill	should	be	repealed.	But	I	want	to point	out	that	it	is	good	in	a way	-	it	will	lower	insurance costs	in	the	long	run. Here	the	concept	good in a way	is	employed	in	a	rather	ordinary	way; similar	things	can	be	said	for	bad in a way.	In	what	follows,	I	will	inquire into	exactly	how	these	concepts	are	related	to	the	thick. Many	thick	terms	seem	to	bear	a	close	relationship	to	either	good in a way	or	bad in a way.2 But	it's	not	obvious	what	exactly	this	relationship is.	At	the	very	least,	it	seems	that	the	typical	utterance	of	many	thick adopt	the	permissive	policy	of	taking	all	semantic	and	pragmatic	relations	as generally	acceptable. 2. A	possible	exception,	involving	multivalent	thick	terms	(e. g.,	'eccentric'	and 'kinky'),	is	discussed	in	section	II.5. Or	is	the	evaluation	semantically	associated	with	it?	The	view	I	shall advance	is	a	specific	version	of	the	latter. Just	how	is	this	semantic	relationship	to	be	characterized?	One	way to formulate the Semantic	View is to say that sentences containing thick	terms	have	evaluative	truth-conditions.	Or,	similarly,	we	might say that thick concepts conceptually, analytically, or semantically entail evaluative contents. It makes little difference which of these formulations	we	choose.	So,	I	shall	fix	on	the	following: Semantic View: Many thick concepts (if not all) conceptually	entail	evaluative	contents.1 1. Two	assumptions	ought	to	be	addressed	briefly.	First,	the	Semantic	View	assumes	there	is	a	suitable	way	of	distinguishing	between	evaluative	and	nonevaluative	content.	But	philosophers like	Foot,	Murdoch,	and	Williams	are commonly	believed	to	have	used	thick	concepts	to	undermine	such	a	distinction (see	Millgram	1995 for	doubts	about this attribution).	Nevertheless, it will	make	no	difference	to	the	substance	of	my	argument	whether	we	accept this	distinction.	The	Semantic	View	can	be	reformulated	in	a	way	that	does not	assume	a	distinction	between	evaluative	and	non-evaluative	content: Modified	Semantic	View:	Many	thick	concepts	(if	not	all)	conceptually entail	the	contents	expressed	by	thin	terms. The	thick/thin	terminology	is	typically	accepted	by	those	who	reject	the	distinction between evaluative and non-evaluative content (e. g., see Jackson 1998,	135–36,	and	Williams	1995,	240).	In	principle,	it	should	be	possible	to draw	a	distinction	between	such	terms	without	committing	to	a	distinction on	the	level	of	content.	My	arguments	in	this	paper	will	support	the	Modified Semantic	View just as effectively as they support the	original formulation. Thus, it	will	make	no	difference	to the	substance	of	my	argument	whether we	accept	a	distinction	between	evaluative	and	non-evaluative	content,	since there	is	a	suitable	reformulation	of	the	Semantic	View	that	does	not	rely	on any	such	distinction. And second, the Semantic View also assumes a controversial relation	-	conceptual	entailment.	In	this	paper,	I	do	not	defend	this	relation,	but	I also	do	not	rely	on	any	of	the	weightier	assumptions	that	are	often	associated with	it	-	e. g.,	that	it	is	best	understood	in	terms	of	synonymy,	or	that	conceptual truths are an epistemologically privileged class (see	Williamson 2007, 48–133,	for	a	recent	critical	survey).	Furthermore,	it's	worth	emphasizing	that there	are	also	skeptics	about	nearly	all	of	the	linguistic	relations	appealed	to by	alternative	views.	Many	have tried to reduce	or	eliminate relations like conventional implicature	(Bach	1999)	and	presupposition	(Atlas	and	Levinson	1981;	Wilson	1975).	Nevertheless,	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper,	I	shall brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) problem	with the present explanation. The connection	between (1) and	(2)	is	neither	reinforceable	nor	cancelable. Let's begin with reinforceability. The basic idea is that conversational implicatures can normally be	made explicit without awkward redundancy (Sadock 1978, 295). I can reinforce the above implicature	by	saying 'Some	students	attended,	but	not	all',	and	this does	not	sound	odd.	But	nothing	similar is true for the	relationship between	(1)	and	(2).	Consider	the	following	attempt: (3) ?	Nancy	is	generous	{and/but}	she's	good	in	a	way.3 This sounds	awkward	and redundant.	So, it seems	unlikely that the connection	between	(1)	and	(2)	is	reinforceable. The second main feature of conversational implicature is cancelability	(Grice	1989,	44).	In	typical	contexts,	the	fact	that	I	utter 'Some students attended' gives you reason to conclude that I also mean	to	convey 'Not	all	students	attended.'	But this implicature	can be	canceled	-	in	other	contexts,	you	may	have	no	reason	to	draw	this conclusion.	Suppose	I	say,	'Some	students	attended;	in	fact,	all	of	them did.' In	this	case,	my	addition	of 'in	fact,	all	of	them	did'	cancels	the implicature associated	with the first part. And	my utterance seems normal. But again, nothing similar is true regarding the connection between	(1)	and	(2).	Consider	an	attempt	at	cancelation	that	parallels the	above	example: (4) #	Nancy	is	generous;	in	fact,	she's	not	good	in	any	way. This sentence seems highly odd, unlike the previous example of cancelation. So, although (1) implies (2) in some sense, this relationship appears to	be	neither cancelable	nor reinforceable.	We therefore	cannot	explain	this	connection	by	appeal	to	conversational implicature. 3. When '?' appears before a sentence, this signifies that the sentence is at least	somewhat	odd.	And	when	'#'	appears,	this	signifies	that	the	sentence is	highly	odd. terms	commits	the	speaker	to	a	claim	involving	either	good	in	a	way or	bad	in	a	way.	For	example,	an	utterance	of	'Nancy	is	generous	(loyal/ kind/courageous)'	tends	to	commit	the	speaker	to	the	claim	that	Nancy is	good	in	some	way.	Similarly,	an	utterance	of	'Nancy	is	rude	(lewd/ brutal/unkind)'	typically	commits	the	speaker	to	the	claim	that	Nancy is	bad	in	some	way.	Of	course,	in	neither	case	is	the	speaker	obviously committed	to	the	stronger	claim	that	Nancy	is	good	or	bad	overall,	but the	speaker	is	certainly	committed	to	the	weaker	claim	that	she	is	good or	bad	in	some	way	or	other. To	bring	this	relationship	into	perspective,	let's	focus	on	the	thick term	'generous'	and	consider	its	relationship	to	'good	in	a	way'.	As	just noted,	it	seems	clear	that	a	typical	utterance	of (1) Nancy	is	generous. commits	the	speaker	to	the	truth	of (2) Nancy	is	good	in	a	way. But	how	do	we	explain	this	connection?	As	I'll	argue,	the	connection	is best	explained	by	the	relevant	instance	of	the	Semantic	View.	That	is,	we can	best	explain	this	by	claiming	that	(2)	is	a	conceptual	entailment	of (1).	But	before	I	state	my	reasons	for	accepting	this,	it's	useful	to	see	the faults	of	another	potential	way	of	explaining	this	connection	-	namely conversational implicature. As we'll see, the shortcomings of this explanation	reveal	the	advantages	of	the	Semantic	View. II.2. Conversational Implicature If a sentence S1 conversationally implicates S2, then S1 (or the fact that someone utters S1) normally gives the hearer a defeasible reason to conclude that the speaker also means to convey S2. For example, my utterance of 'Some students attended' normally gives you	reason	to	conclude	that I	also	mean	to	convey 'Not	all	students attended.'	Typically,	however,	the	connection	between	S1	and	S2	can be	reinforced	and	canceled	without	oddity.	And	this is	precisely the brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) entailed	by	the	first	part,	and	that's	why	(4)	seems	so	odd.	Thus,	SVGenerous	explains	all	the	data	we've	seen	thus	far. SV-Generous treats 'generous' and 'good in a way' similarly to how we typically treat 'bachelor' and 'unmarried'. And it's worth emphasizing that there is further linguistic data to support this correlation.	In	particular,	the	following	conjunction	seems	highly	odd: (5) #	Nancy	is	generous,	and	she's	not	good	in	any	way. And	(5)	seems	nearly	as	odd	as (6) #	Jack	is	a	bachelor,	and	he's	not	unmarried. And	much	like	that	of	(6),	the	oddity	of	(5)	cannot	be	solely	attributed to	either	one	of	its	conjuncts.	After	all,	these	seem	to	be	quite	normal: (7) Nancy	is	generous. (8) She's	not	good	in	any	way. Since (7) and (8) are felicitous in their own right, it follows that neither conjunct within (5) is by itself responsible for the overall inappropriateness of (5). Clearly it's something about their combination	that	strikes	us	as	highly	odd.	And	SV-Generous	explains this by allowing us to claim that the conjunction of (7) and (8) generates	a	contradiction.5 5. Instead of SV-Generous, can	we simply hold that generous a priori entails good in a way	(without	holding	that	this	entailment	is	conceptual)?	It	appears not	-	this	weaker	alternative	does	not	adequately	explain	the	awkwardness of	the	above	sentences.	For	example,	if	we	merely	claim	that	the	first	part	of (5)	a	priori	entails	what	the	second	part	denies,	this	would	not	by	itself	tell	us why	(5)	is	awkward.	This	is	because	there	need	be	no	awkwardness	when	one denies	what	is	a	priori	entailed	by	the	first	part	of	one's	utterance.	Consider mathematical	statements	like (i)	85	men	and	48	women	attended,	and	there	were	no	more	than	123 men	and	women	combined. The	first	part	of	this	sentence	a	priori	entails	what's	denied	by	the	second part.	But	the	sentence	itself	seems	felicitous.	The	fact	that	sentences	(3)–(5) are	infelicitous	suggests	that	they	are	somehow	linguistically	impermissible, II.3. The Semantic View of 'Generous' Although	I	will	consider	other	rival	explanations	in	a	moment	(section II.4), I first want to show that the problems for the conversational implicature explanation are easily handled by a particular instance of the Semantic View. Since good in a way is clearly evaluative, the following	would	be	an	instance	of	the	Semantic	View: SV-Generous: The thick concept generous conceptually entails	good in a way.4 This	view	straightforwardly	explains	the	relationship	between	(1)	and (2)	by claiming that (1) conceptually entails (2). But	how	well does SV-Generous	explain	the	sentences	that	led	us	to	reject	the	appeal	to conversational	implicature? SV-Generous easily explains the fact that (3) seems awkward. According to SV-Generous, the second part of (3) is conceptually entailed	by	the	first	part.	Thus, the	second	clause is redundant,	and that's	why	(3)	seems	odd.	Why	does	(4)	seem	so	highly	odd?	According to	SV-Generous,	the	second	part	of	(4)	contradicts	what	is	conceptually 4. It should	be	noted that	SV-Generous	does	not	entail the controversial thesis	that	the	description	and	evaluation	of	generous	can	be	"disentangled"	(see McDowell	[1981]	for	the	seminal	paper	on	this).	Nothing	about	SV-Generous entails that	we	could	exhaustively	state the	descriptive	(or	non-evaluative) content	of	generous.	Neither	does	it	entail	that	we	could	exhaust	its	evaluative content,	since	good in a way	need	not	be	seen	as	its	only	evaluative	content. On	the	other	hand,	some	people	may	hold	a	semantic-type	view	about	the evaluation	associated	with	'generous'	but	reject	my	supposition	that 'generous'	inherits	its	evaluation	from	an	associated	thin	concept	like	good in a way. On	this	view,	thick	evaluation	is	sui	generis.	This	alternative	view	deserves serious	consideration	in	its	own	right,	but	it	remains	unclear	how	such	a	view can explain the data discussed in this paper regarding the connection between	'generous'	and	'good	in	a	way'.	If	I	am	right	that	SV-Generous	provides the	best	explanation	of that	data, then it	appears that this	alternative	view does	not	adequately	characterize	the	way	in	which 'generous' is	associated with	evaluation.	Moreover,	as	I	note	in	section	II.5,	the	same	goes	for	other thick terms like 'courageous', 'murder', 'brutal', and 'kind'.	However, in that section, I concede that	my	overall argument	may	not apply to	multivalent thick terms	(e. g., 'eccentric', 'kinky',	and 'unorthodox').	So,	my	argument in this paper allows for the possibility that this alternative view could claim some	significant	territory	within	the	class	of	multivalent	thick	terms. brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) Gas	Station	Context Traveler: "Is	there	a	way	to	get	from	Ithaca	to	New	Haven?" Gas Station Clerk:	"Yes,	there	is	a	way	-	just	head	east	on Highway	17." Bus	Station	Context Traveler:	"Is	there	a	way	to	get	from	Ithaca	to	New	Haven?" Bus Station Clerk: "Unfortunately, there's not any way. You'll	have to take the	bus into	NYC	and then take the train	to	New	Haven." The	bus	clerk	says	"there's	not	any	way",	while	the	gas	clerk	says	"there is	a	way".	But	it	seems	plausible	that	both	of	their	utterances	could	be true.6 Relative	to	different	contexts,	their	utterances	express	different propositions. The bus clerk is asserting that there's no	way by bus, whereas	the	gas	clerk	is	merely	asserting	that	there	is	a	way	by	car. In	general,	when	we	utter	that	there	is	(or	is	not)	a	way	to	do	such and such, we are very seldom asserting that there is (or is not) a logically	possible	way.	Typically,	the	scope	of	the	utterance	is	restricted by	a	contextual	parameter	-	in	this	case,	a	quantifier	domain.	Here's one	way	of	representing	how	the	above	utterances	are	associated	with domains: 'There	is	a	way'	is	true	relative	to	a	context	C	if	and	only if	there	is	some	way	w	within	the	domain	provided	by	C.7 6. Under	some	pragmatic	views	of	context-sensitivity,	we	must	say	that	the	bus clerk's	utterance	expresses	a false	proposition,	but	he	communicates	something	true	nonetheless.	In	what	follows,	I	assume	a	semantic	theory	of	context-sensitivity,	according	to	which	they	can	both	say	something	true	relative to	their	own	contexts.	(See	Stanley	and	Szabó	[2000]	for	a	discussion	of	these two	views.)	My	assumption,	however,	will	make	little	substantive	difference to	what	I	go	on	to	say.	There	are	ways	of	rephrasing	my	claims	so	as	to	reflect a	pragmatic	view	instead	of	a	semantic	one. 7. This	model	is	probably	too	simplistic	to	handle	more	complicated	quantifier expressions.	But	it	will	suffice	for	current	purposes.	See	Stanley	and	Szabó At	this	point, it	will	be	objected	that	we	can	envision	contexts	in which	an	utterance	of	(5)	would	not	seem	odd.	Imagine	that	the	speaker of (5) is someone like Ebenezer Scrooge who disvalues generosity. Or,	to	make	the	example	more	vivid,	imagine	that	Scrooge	utters	(5) within	a	community	of	speakers	who	also	disvalue	generosity.	Within this context, it seems possible for Scrooge to utter (5) felicitously. The	problem is that SV-Generous initially seems to	predict that his utterance	of	(5)	would	express	something	contradictory. This	objection	can	be	avoided	once	we	clarify	SV-Generous	in	the right	way.	In	effect,	SV-Generous	asserts	that	the	concept	expressed	by 'good	in	a	way'	is	conceptually	entailed	by	generous.	But	it's	misleading to speak about the concept expressed	by 'good in a	way', since this phrase expresses many different concepts in different contexts of utterance.	As	I	will	suggest,	Scrooge's	utterance	can	be	explained	if	we clarify	SV-Generous	in	a	way	that	is	mindful	of	this	context-sensitivity. Let	me	first	explain	how	'good	in	a	way'	is	context-sensitive	and	then move	on	to	the	needed	clarification	of	SV-Generous. The primary mechanism responsible for the context-sensitivity of 'good in a	way' is the constituent expression 'a	way'. To see this, consider	two	contexts	where	'a	way'	occurs: and	SV-Generous	holds	that	this	impermissibility	is	semantic	in	nature.	But the apriority of these sentences	does	not seem to	help	out in explaining their	infelicity. One	might	object	by	pointing	to	certain	a	priori	false	sentences	that	are awkward.	Consider (ii)	?	Nancy	gives	much	time	and	money	to	people	in	need,	and	she	is not	good	in	any	way. For	the	reasons	stated	above,	my	reply	is	that	the	awkwardness	of	(ii)	ought to	be	explained	by	other	means	(aside	from	merely	citing	a	priori	entailment). Ultimately,	we	may	wish	to	conclude	that	the	complex	concept	gives much time and money to people in need	conceptually	entails	good in a way,	provided	there are	no	better	ways	of	explaining	the	awkwardness	of	(ii).	I	am	not	opposed to	this	potential	conclusion.	Those	who	reject	the	possibility	of	conceptual entailments	from	non-evaluative	to	evaluative	sentences	might	be	troubled by	this	conclusion.	But	I	am	in	no	way	committed	to	rejecting	this	possibility. brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) With	this	clarified	version	in	mind,	let	us	now	return	to	the	main objection.	Does	this	view	predict	that	Scrooge's	utterance	of	(5)	must be	contradictory?	It	certainly	does	not	predict	this,	provided	we	specify the	relevant	contexts	in	the	right	way.	SV-Generous	Clarified	predicts only that (5) expresses a contradiction	within select contexts. But, as long as Scrooge's context is not among those selected, the view in question does not predict that he would be expressing something false	or	contradictory in	uttering	(5). In	other	words, this	view	need not	hold	that	the	first	part	of	(5)	conceptually	entails	what	the	second part	denies	within Scrooge's context. But what are the select contexts mentioned in SV-Generous Clarified? This can be answered if we use our linguistic data as a guide. If sentences like (3)–(5) sound	odd	within a given context C, then	we should	find	a	principled	way	of including	C among the relevant contexts. Similarly, if those sentences are felicitous within some	context	C*,	then	we	should	find	a	principled	way	of	excluding C*	from	the	relevant	contexts.	It	is	far	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper to	fully	specify	the	relevant	class	of	contexts,9 but	I	think	it	is	clear	that we	could	have	a	principled	way	of	specifying	this	class.	For	example, let's	suppose	that	(3)–(5)	are	awkward	within	all	contexts	except	those in	which	a	person	like	Scrooge	is	the	speaker.	In	this	case,	we	should hold that the relevant class includes all and only those contexts in which	the	speaker	is	not	presumed	to	disvalue	generosity.	No	doubt, this is oversimplified, but the basic strategy should be clear: first, we	find	a	distinctive feature	of	all the	contexts in	which (3)–(5)	are being	good.	That	is,	if	we	allow	all	logically	possible	ways	to	count	as	ways of	being	good	(e. g.,	being	good	for	use	in	a	philosophical	discussion	on	goodness),	then	it	might	be	conceptually	true	that	everything	is	good	in	some	way or	other.	See	Thomson (2008, 10) for an	argument for this.	However, this difficulty	can	be	avoided	if	we	hold	that	the	select	contexts	include	contexts with	restricted	domains	(as	well	as	unrestricted	ones). 9. This is	partly	because	the	contexts	are	numerous	but	also	because	there is bound	to	be	disagreement	and	uncertainty	about	whether	(3)–(5)	are	felicitous	within	certain	contexts. Under	this	model,	the	bus	clerk's	utterance	can	be	true	relative	to	his context,	even	if	the	gas	clerk	is	right	about	there	being	a	way	of	getting to	New	Haven	by	car.	Traveling	by	car	is	a	way	that	is	not	contained within	the	domain	of	the	bus	station	context. Something	similar	can	be	said	for	'good	in	a	way'.	When	we	utter that	there	is	(or	is	not)	a	way	in	which	A	is	good,	we	are	very	seldom asserting	that	there	is	(or	is	not)	a	logically	possible	way.	Here	again, the utterance is restricted by being contextually associated with a particular	domain: 'A	is	good	in	a	way'	is	true	relative	to	a	context	C	if	and only	if	there	is	some	way	w	within	the	domain	provided by	C	such	that	A	is	good	in	w. Under	this	model,	the	sentence	'She	is	good	in	a	way'	might	be	true relative to	some	contexts	and false relative to	others,	depending	on which	ways	of	being	good	are	contained	within	the	domain	of	each context. These considerations motivate a particular way of clarifying SVGenerous,	one	that	is	mindful	of	the	context-sensitivity	of	'good	in	a way'. Instead	of referring to concepts, this clarified	version refers to sentences	whose	truth-values	can	be	relativized	to	contexts: SV-Generous Clarified: The sentence 'A is generous' conceptually entails that 'A is good in a way' is true relative	to	select	contexts. To	put this in	a	slightly	different	way,	we	can	say	that,	whenever	a person	is	generous,	it	follows	conceptually	that	there	is	a	select	class of	contextual	domains	each	containing	a	way	in	which	that	person is	good.8 (2000,	248–58)	for	a	critique	of	this	simple	model	and	a	development	of	a different	semantic	model. 8. This	view	might	be trivially true if	we select	only contexts that	have	unrestricted domains	-	i. e., domains that contain all logically possible	ways of brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) generosity.	Thus,	SV-Generous	is	able	to	explain	the	linguistic	data that	we've	encountered. II.4. Two Rival Explanations So far, we've seen that SV-Generous can explain the relationship between (1) and (2), and can also predict the oddity of (3)–(5). Conversational	implicature	does	not	adequately	account	for	this	data. In	order	to	solidify	my	case	for	SV-Generous,	I	now	argue	that	two	of the	more	likely	alternative	hypotheses	fail	to	explain	particular	parts of	this	data.	The	first	alternative	appeals	to	conventional	implicature; the	second	appeals	to	presupposition. II.4.a. Conventional Implicature The relation of conventional implicature differs from conceptual entailment	in	that	the	former	is	detachable.	More	precisely,	a	sentence S1	carries	I	as	a	conventional	implicature	only	if	there	could	be	another sentence	S2	that	is	truth-conditionally	equivalent	to	S1	but	does	not carry I as an implicature.10 Nothing similar is true for conceptual entailment. Conventional implicatures are triggered by particular lexical items or linguistic constructions. For example, it's plausible that	'Smith	hasn't	arrived	yet'	conventionally	implicates	that	Smith	is expected	to	arrive	and	that	this	implicature	is	triggered	specifically	by the	word	'yet'.	Other	conventional	implicatures	are	said	to	be	triggered by	words	like	'but',	'so',	'even',	'still',	'damn',	and	'therefore',	as	well	as appositives	and	parenthetical	constructions. As	an	alternative	to	SV-Generous,	we	may	then	wish	to	explain	the connection	between	(1)	and	(2)	by	claiming	that	(2)	is	a	conventional implicature	triggered	by	the	word	'generous'	as	it	occurs	in	(1).	Let's call	this	explanation	CI-Generous.	This	explanation	may	also	be	able to	account	for	the	oddity	of	(5),	since	conventional	implicatures	cannot 10. R.M.	Hare	seems	to	believe	that	the	evaluations	associated	with	thick	terms are detachable (Hare 1963, 188–89).	And	Blackburn's example of 'fat' and 'fat↓'	appears	to	be	a	case	where	the	former	is	the	detached	counterpart	of	the latter	(1992,	290;	1998,	95). awkward,	and	then	we	specify	that	the	relevant	class	includes	all	and only	the	contexts	that	have	this	feature. Most likely,	the	select	contexts	will	exclude	all	contexts	in	which the relevant conversational participants are presumed to disvalue generosity.	But	is	it	ad	hoc	to	exclude	these	contexts?	Is	this	exclusion motivated solely by the need to explain Scrooge's utterances? No. There	are	independent	reasons	for	holding	that	the	relevant	contexts will have domains that don't contain the ways of being good that conversational participants are presumed to disvalue. To see this, consider	sentence	(8): (8) She's	not	good	in	any	way. The truth-value of an utterance of (8) can depend on what conversational participants are presumed to disvalue. For example, suppose	we	are	in	a	context	in	which	it's	known	that	all	conversational participants disvalue being a good thief (e. g., because we all have contempt	for	thieves	in	general).	In	this	context,	it	seems	that	I	could truthfully	utter	(8)	even	though	the	person	I'm	referring	to	is	a	good thief. This is because the domain of our context does not contain being	a	good	thief	among	the	ways	of	being	good.	Being	a	good	thief is	outside	our	domain,	precisely	because	we're	presumed	to	disvalue this	way	of	being	good.	Thus, it is independently	plausible that the relevant contexts have domains that do not contain the ways that conversational	participants	are	presumed	to	disvalue.	Moreover,	since it	is	taken	as	common	knowledge	that	Scrooge	disvalues	generosity,	it is	no	surprise	that	certain	of	his	contextual	domains	do	not	contain	the ways	of	being	good	that	are	associated	with	generosity. If the above is correct, then the felicity of Scrooge's utterance of (5) poses no problem for the clarified version of SV-Generous. When understood properly, this view predicts that (5) expresses something false and contradictory in	most contexts. But it allows for	the	possibility	that	(5)	might	be	true	relative	to	certain	contexts in which conversational participants are presumed to disvalue brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) reinforceable.14	And this	means that	CI-Generous	does	not	by itself predict	the	infelicity	of	(3).15 14. Proponents	of	CI-Generous	might resist	my	objection	by trying to	explain away	the	felicity	of	(9a–d).	In	particular,	they	might	claim	that	each	boldfaced word	is	ambiguous	in	that	it	can	carry	different	implicatures	in	different	contexts.	For	instance,	the	first	part	of	(9d)	can,	in	some	cases,	implicate	that	the speaker	hates	mowing the lawn,	but in	other	cases, it	can implicate that the speaker	hates	the lawn itself.	Thus,	the	proponent	of	CI-Generous	may	wish	to explain	the	felicity	of	(9d)	by	insisting	that	its	second	clause	is	not	completely redundant,	because	it	clarifies	the	ambiguity	of	the	first	clause	and	thereby adds	something	new.	However,	this	type	of	explanation	fails	to	explain	the felicity	of	(9d),	because	it	incorrectly	predicts	that	the	following	should	also be	felicitous: ?	I	went	to	the	bank,	and	I	went	to	a	place	that	deals	with	money. The	boldfaced	word	in	this	sentence	is	ambiguous	between	riverbanks	and financial institutions,	but the second	clause	clarifies that the	first clause is about	financial	institutions.	The	second	clause	therefore	adds	something	new in the same	way that	was attributed to the second clause of (9d). But the example	provided	here	still	seems	awkward.	The	felicity	of	(9a–d)	therefore cannot	be	explained	away	as	suggested. 15. It	might	be	contended	that,	although	some	conventional	implicatures	are	reinforceable,	there	are	well-defined	types	of	conventional	implicatures	that	are not	-	and	perhaps	the	infelicity	of	(3)	can	be	modeled	after	those	particular types.	For	example,	it	has	been	argued	that	parenthetical	constructions,	like the	following,	trigger	non-reinforceable	conventional	implicatures	-	'Lance Armstrong,	the cyclist,	battled	cancer.'	According	to	Christopher	Potts	(2007, 668),	this	sentence	carries	the	implicature	that	Lance	Armstrong	is	a	cyclist. And	this	implicature	is	obviously	not	reinforceable,	as	shown	in	(i): (i)	?	Lance	Armstrong,	the	cyclist,	battled	cancer.	And	he	is	a	cyclist. However,	it	is	clear	that	the	infelicity	of	(3)	cannot	be	modeled	after	that	of	(i). As	Potts	(2007,	671)	points	out,	sentence	(i)	retains	its	redundancy	when	that sentence	is	transposed.	By	transposing	(i),	we	get (ii)	?	Lance	Armstrong	is	a	cyclist	-	he,	the	cyclist,	battled	cancer. And	(ii)	seems	just	as	redundant	as	(i).	But,	unlike	that	of	(i), the	infelicity of	(3)	does	not	survive	transposition.	By	transposing	(3),	we	get	a	perfectly normal	sentence	that	displays	no	redundancy: (iii)	Nancy	is	good	in	a	way	-	she's	generous. be	canceled	without	oddity.	For	example,	it	would	seem	odd	in	many contexts	to	say	'Smith	hasn't	arrived	yet,	and	no	one	is	expecting	her'. The	main	problem	with	CI-Generous	is	that	it	does	not	lead	us	to expect	the	awkwardness	of	(3): (3) ?	Nancy	is	generous,	{and/but}	she's	good	in	a	way. It is distinctive of conceptual entailments that they are not reinforceable	-	they cannot normally be made explicit without awkward	redundancy.11 So,	SV-Generous	correctly	predicts	the	oddity of (3). But linguists are highly reluctant to claim that conventional implicatures	are	not	reinforceable.12	And	this	is	for	good	reason.	Notice that	many	paradigmatic	examples	of	conventional	implicatures	can	be reinforced: (9) a.	Smith	has	not	arrived	yet,	but	he	is	expected. b.	Even	Bill passed the test, and	he	was	among the least likely. c.	Sophie	is	a	baby,	but	she's	quiet,	and	most	babies	are	not quiet. d.	It's	my	turn	to	mow	the	damn	lawn,	and	I	hate	mowing the	lawn. In each example, the boldfaced words trigger the implicatures stated	explicitly	in	the	rightmost	clause.13 But	each	of	(9a–d)	sounds normal. Thus, it appears that many conventional implicatures are 11. An	exception	to	this	is	discussed	below	with	regard	to	sentence	(10). 12. Potts (2007,	668)	claims that the implicatures triggered	by	some	particular constructions	are	not	reinforceable,	but	he	shies	away	from	the	general	claim. See	footnote	15	for	discussion	on	these	constructions. 13. It	is	possible	to	quibble	over	whether	the	implicatures	are	stated	exactly	as they should be. But I doubt very	much that the appropriate changes	will make	a	difference	to	what	I	say	here	and	below.	For	example,	(9b)	could	be rephrased	as	'Even	Bill	passed	the	test,	and	that	was	surprising/unexpected' without	creating	infelicity. brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) Does rhetorical opposition explain	why the above examples of conventional implicature in	(9a–d)	are felicitous?	At	best, it	would account	only	for	the	felicity	of	(9a),	leaving	(9b–d)	untouched.	The concession/affirmation structure required for rhetorical	opposition is	not	present	in	(9b–d).	This	can	be	seen	from	the	fact	that	there	is no	need	for	a	'but'	connective	between	the	first	and	second	clauses of	(9b–d). In short, we've seen that certain paradigmatic examples of conventional	implicatures	are	reinforceable.	I	do	not	claim	that	all	are reinforceable	-	only	that	some are.	And	this	is	enough	to	establish	that an	appeal to	conventional implicature	does	not	by itself	predict the infelicity	of	(3).	Thus,	unlike	SV-Generous,	it	seems	that	CI-Generous cannot	adequately	account	for	all	the	data	we've	encountered. II.4.b. Presupposition Can	we	appeal	to	presupposition	to	explain	this	data?	Presupposition can	be	understood	in	two	general	ways.18 First,	it	may	be	understood	in terms	of	a	speaker	taking	a	proposition	for	granted	(i.	e.,	assuming	its truth)	in	making	an	utterance	(Stalnaker	1970).	For	example,	in	uttering (11) Smith	regrets	that	he	drank	Pabst. the	speaker	clearly	takes	the	following	for	granted: P:	that	Smith	drank	Pabst. A second way of understanding presupposition is in terms of backgrounding	a	proposition.	Consider	the	following: (12) Smith,	who	drank	Pabst,	is	feeling	ill. (12) clearly implies P in some sense, but it does not take P for granted	-	after	all,	(12)	might	convey	P	as	completely	new	information. Still,	there	is	a	legitimate	sense	in	which	(12)	seems	to	background	P. The	basic	idea	is	that	a	sentence,	such	as	(12),	can	convey	a	number 18. See	Chierchia	and	McConnell-Ginet	(1990,	281–83)	for	a	general	discussion. It might be thought that SV-Generous falls prey to the same objection that I've raised against CI-Generous. In particular, one might	point	out	that	there	are	examples	of	conceptual	entailment	that sound	felicitous	when	reinforced.	Consider	an	example	adapted	from Horn	(1991): (10)	Bush	won	by	a	small	margin,	but	win	he	did. In	this	example, the	first	clause	conceptually	entails the	second,	but the	whole sentence seems perfectly felicitous.	Does this	mean that SV-Generous falls prey to the same objection raised against CIGenerous	-	i. e.,	that	it	does	not	lead	us	to	expect	the	infelicity	of	(3)? No.	The	difference	is	that	there	are	established	ways	of	accounting for	the	fact	that	sentences	like	(10)	are	reinforceable,	without	predicting that (3) should be reinforceable. But no similar account seems in the offing for (9a–d). For instance, Laurence	Horn has argued that sentences	like	(10)	are	instances	of	"rhetorical	opposition".	In	asserting the	first clause, the speaker	makes	a concession (e. g., she concedes Bush's relative lack of popularity). But in the second clause, the speaker	affirms	something	"on	the	opposite	side	of	the	argumentative or	emotive	ledger"	from	what	was	conceded	in	the	first	clause	(Horn 1991, 334). This concession/affirmation structure is signaled by the fact that a 'but' connective (or similar device16) is necessary for its felicity	-	replacing 'but' with 'and' makes (10) infelicitous. This concession/affirmation structure, according to Horn, explains why sentences like (10) are felicitous.17 But it clearly does not predict that	(3)	should	be	similarly	felicitous,	since	(3)	lacks	this	concession/ affirmation	structure	and	involves	no	rhetorical	opposition. The	second	clause	of	(iii)	is	naturally	heard	as	expanding	upon	the	first	clause. Thus,	when	(3) is transposed, its redundancy	disappears.	Therefore, the	redundancy	of	(3)	cannot	be	modeled	after	that	of	parenthetical	constructions like	(i). 16. Similar	devices include 'nonetheless', 'just the same', 'be that as it	may', or 'despite	this'. 17. For	a	similar	explanation,	see	Ward	(1988,	191). brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) (13) Smith	does	not	regret	drinking	Pabst. (14) Smith,	who	drank	Pabst,	is	not	feeling	ill. But	nothing	similar is true for (1). It is	clear that the	negation	of (1) does	not	presuppose	(2).	More	precisely,	the	following	statement, (15) Nancy	is	not	generous clearly	does	not	take	for	granted	or	background	the	proposition	that Nancy	is	good	in	a	way.	And	this	seems	true	for	any	context	of	utterance. Alternatively,	it	might	be	claimed	that	the	relevant	presupposition of	(1),	as	well	as	(15),	is	one	of	the	following: Q:	that	people	who	are	liberal	in	giving	and	sharing	are good	in	a	particular	way. R:	that	if	Nancy	is	liberal	in	giving	and	sharing,	then	she's good	in	a	particular	way.19 And	since the	combination	of (1)	with	either	Q	or	R	would	plausibly entail	(2),	this	might	help	us	explain	the	connection	between	(1)	and	(2). I	doubt	very	much	that	there	are	any	contexts	in	which	Q	or	R	are triggered	as	presuppositions	by	the	word	'generous'.20 But	let's	suppose, for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	this	does	occur	in	at	least	some	contexts. For	example,	let's	suppose	that	when	I	utter	negations	like	'Nancy	is	not generous	-	she's	greedy	and	selfish',	I	have	thereby	presupposed	one of	Q	or	R.	Even	so,	this	assumption	does	not	help	us	explain	the	oddity 19. The	suggestion	that	(1)	may	presuppose	either	Q	or	R	is	a	possibility	that	I have loosely	modeled after some claims that	Väyrynen (2012)	makes	with regard	to	'lewd'.	He	does	not	explicitly	accept	a	presupposition	account,	but this	view	is	implicit	in	his	discussion. 20.	The attempted justification for this claim	would	most likely appeal to the behavior	of	objectionable	thick	concepts	in	negations,	modals,	disjunctions, and conditionals (see	Väyrynen 2012). But, as I argue in section III,	we already	have	widely	accepted	pragmatic	mechanisms	for	explaining	this	behavior	(e. g.,	negative	strengthening	and	clausal	implicature)	without	postulating that	Q	or	R	are	presuppositions. of different propositions, some of which are the main message or point	of	the	utterance	(i. e.,	the	foreground	entailments),	while	others are	backgrounded	(Levinson	1983).	The	main	message	of	(12)	is	that Smith	is	feeling	ill,	whereas	P	is	merely	conveyed	as	background. For	present	purposes,	we	can	simply	take	the	disjunction	of	these two	views	as	a	necessary	condition	for	presupposition.	More	precisely, a	speaker	presupposes	a	proposition	P	in	uttering	a	sentence	only	if	she either	backgrounds	P	or	takes	P	for	granted	in	making	that	utterance. How does this help us explain the data	we've encountered?	An interpreter's	acceptance	of	an	utterance's	presupposition	can	act	as	a precondition	for	the	felicity	of	that	utterance.	If	you	believe	that	Smith never	drank	Pabst,	you	might	find	it	odd	for	someone	to	utter	either (11)	or	(12).	But	it	is	worth	noting	that	presuppositions	may	occur	in some	contexts	and	disappear	in	others.	For	example,	in	(11),	the	factive verb 'regrets' triggers	P	as	a	presupposition,	but	that	presupposition disappears in other contexts where that verb is used	-	e. g., 'Smith does not regret drinking Pabst, because he never did!' But in	most contexts, that verb	will trigger the relevant presupposition. In sum, the presupposition-based explanation of our data would state that the thick term 'generous' triggers a presupposition in at least some contexts	and	that	this	allows	us	to	explain	the	connection	between	(1) and	(2)	as	well	as	the	infelicity	of	(3)–(5). I shall	argue that the infelicity	of (5)	cannot	be	explained in this way.	But,	in	order	to	assess	this	potential	explanation,	we	must	be	clear on	what	presuppositions	might	conceivably	be	triggered	by	the	word 'generous'.	In	particular,	what	is	the	putative	presupposition	of	(1)? For	starters,	we	cannot	plausibly	claim	that	(1)	directly	presupposes (2). This is because the connection between (1) and (2) lacks one of the distinctive features of presupposition	-	"constancy under negation"	(Huang	2007,	67).	If	the	utterance	of	an	affirmative	sentence S	presupposes	a	proposition	P,	then	we	typically	expect	that	a	simple negation	of	S	will	also	presuppose	P.	For	example,	the	negations	of	(11) and	(12)	-	appearing	respectively	as	(13)	and	(14)	below	-	both	seem to	presuppose	that	Smith	drank	Pabst: brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) particular	claim	about	a	single	thick	concept	(i. e.,	generous),	while	the Semantic	View	is	a	general	claim	that's	supposed	to	be	true	of	many thick	concepts.	How	do	we	get	from	SV-Generous	to	the	more	general Semantic	View? For the sake	of simplicity, the above argument	has focused	only on	data	involving	the	thick	term	'generous'.	But	there	are	parallel	data involving	other thick terms.	For	example, in the	above	argument, it was	noted	that	(3)	seems	awkwardly	redundant.	But	the	same	goes	for other	positive	thick	terms,	like	'kind'	and	'courageous': (16) ?	Jones	is	kind,	{and/but}	he's	good	in	a	way. (17) ?	Smith	is	courageous,	{and/but}	he's	good	in	a	way. Moreover, negative thick terms, like 'murder' and 'brutal', exhibit similar	behavior	with	respect to	a	different	evaluative	concept	-	bad in a way: (18) ?	That	was	a	murder,	{and/but}	it	was	bad	in	a	way. (19) ?	That	is	brutal,	{and/but}	it's	bad	in	a	way. (16)–(19)	seem	at	least	somewhat	odd.	And	this	is	just	what	we	would expect	if	the	Semantic	View	were	true	of	'murder',	'brutal',	'kind',	and 'courageous'. On this view, (16)–(19) seem odd because they are redundant:	their	first	conjuncts	conceptually	entail	what	their	second conjuncts	assert. Another	important	datum	used	in	the	above	argument	is	the	fact that	(5) is	highly	odd,	even	though	each	of its	conjuncts is	perfectly normal. But similar claims seem true regarding 'kind', 'courageous', 'murder',	and	'brutal': (20)	#	Jones	is	kind,	and	he's	not	good	in	any	way. (21) #	Smith	is	courageous,	and	she's	not	good	in	any	way. (22)	#	That	was	a	murder,	and	it	was	not	bad	in	any	way. (23)	#	That	is	brutal,	and	it's	not	bad	in	any	way. of (5).	The reason is that there are	many	normal contexts in	which neither	Q	nor	R	are	presupposed	by	uses	of	'generous',	but	in	which	(5) would	still	sound	odd.	To	see	this,	let's	focus	on	one	particular	context in	which	a	speaker	utters	the	negation	of	(1): Bob: "Nancy is highly controlled in her giving and sharing,	and	that's	what	makes	her	fiscally	smart.	She	is not generous. But she's not selfish either. I admire her approach	to	finances." It	seems	clear	that	Bob's	utterance	of	the	negation	of	(1)	does	not	imply, let	alone	presuppose,	either	Q	or	R.	In	particular,	there	is	no	sense	in which	Bob	has	taken	Q	or	R	for	granted,	nor	is	there	any	sense	in	which he	has	conveyed	Q	or	R	as	background.	Thus,	it	seems	unlikely	that any	of	these	propositions	are	presupposed	by	Bob's	use	of	'generous' in	this	particular	context.	The	trouble,	however,	is	that	the	context	just described	is	one	in	which	(5)	would	sound	odd.	For	example,	imagine that	Bob's	interlocutor,	Sue,	responds	to	him	as	follows: Sue: "I disagree	with you, Bob.	Nancy is generous, and she's	not	good	in	any	way." Here,	Sue's	utterance	of	(5)	is	clearly	infelicitous.	And	this	means	that the	oddity	of	(5)	outstretches	contexts	in	which	propositions	like	Q	or	R are	presupposed	(if	there	are	any).	After	all,	the	context	just	described is	one	where	those	presuppositions	are	absent	while	the	oddity	of	(5) remains.	Thus,	it's	hard	to	see	how	an	appeal	to	presupposition	could explain	the	infelicity	of	sentences	like	(5). II.5. Generalizing the Argument It	looks	quite	plausible	that	SV-Generous	provides	the	best	explanation of the data we've seen. I've not surveyed all possible explanations, but I've shown that the	main contenders are unable to explain the infelicity	of	one	or	another	of	(3)–(5).	Thus,	I	think	there	is	good	reason to	believe	that	SV-Generous	is	true.	However,	SV-Generous	is	a	very brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) than	taking	a	stand	on	this	issue,	let	me	instead	assert	the	following conditional: If slurs are thick terms, then	we've seen no automatic reason	to	extend	the	Semantic	View	to	cover	them.	In	particular,	the argument	I	have	advanced	in	favor	of	the	Semantic	View	relies	on	data like	(18)–(19)	and	(22)–(23).	But	it's	doubtful	that	similar	data	will	be available	for	all	slurs.	For	example,	the	sentence	'Dr.	K	is	a	gringo,	and he's	not	bad	in	any	way'	strikes	me	as	infelicitous,	but	its	infelicity	may be	wholly	attributable to the	first	conjunct, 'Dr.	K is	a	gringo.'	Thus, whether or not	we	have reason to extend the Semantic	View to all thick	terms	may	depend	on	whether	we	include	slurs	among	the	thick. I	do	not	deny	that	the	Semantic	View	is	true	of	slurs	-	I	merely	claim that	my	argument	does	not	clearly	establish	this. And second, consider	multivalent thick terms (e. g., 'unorthodox', 'eccentric',	'quirky',	'kinky',	and	'grotesque').21 Roughly	speaking,	these are thick terms that are commonly	used to evaluate	both	positively and	negatively,	perhaps	in	different	contexts.22	Do	these	terms	present a	problem	for	the	argument	I	have	advanced?	The	first	thing	to	note is	that	the	phenomenon	of	multivalence	is	perfectly	compatible	with the	view	that	all thick	concepts	conceptually	entail	either	good in	a way	or	bad in a	way. In	general, a concept can	be	used to	evaluate, say, negatively, even if it conceptually entails good in a	way	-	e.	g., 'Jones	is	a	good	thief	and	therefore	not	to	be	trusted.'	We	could	even suppose,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	both	the	positive	and	negative evaluations	of	a	multivalent	thick	term	are	conceptually	encoded	(i.	e., part	of	its	meaning).	Even	this	supposition	is	perfectly	compatible	with the	view	that	all thick	concepts	conceptually	entail	either	good in	a way	or	bad	in	a	way,	because	it	is	possible	that	each	multivalent	thick 21. Thanks to an anonymous referee for reminding me of multivalence and pointing	out	how	my	argument	may	not	extend	to	such	terms. 22. This	rough	account	of	multivalence	might	be	so	broad	as	to	include	too	many thick	terms	as	multivalent,	but	nothing	of	substance	in	this	paper	will	rely	on the	account.	For	a	sustained	discussion	on	multivalence,	see	Väyrynen	(2011). As	he	notes,	the	positive	and	negative	use	of	these	terms	is	meant	to	be	restricted	to	literal	usage	(2011,	4). (20)–(23)	seem	highly	awkward,	even	though	each	of	their	conjuncts is	perfectly	normal.	And this too is just	what	we	would	expect if the Semantic	View	were	true	of	these	thick	terms.	According	to	this	view, (20)–(23)	sound	highly	odd	because	they	are	contradictory:	their	second conjuncts	contradict	what	their	first	conjuncts	conceptually	entail. This	brings	up	two	important	points.	The	first	is	that	it	looks	like	the argument	advanced	regarding	'generous'	will	apply	with	equal	efficacy to	these	other	thick	terms	-	'murder', 'brutal', 'kind',	and	'courageous'. The rival explanations discussed earlier would be inferior to the relevant	instance	of	the	Semantic	View	for	the	same	general	reasons that	were	brought	up	with regard to 'generous'. So,	we	have strong reason	to	believe	the	Semantic	View	is	also	true	of	these	thick	terms. The second point is that the five thick terms discussed herein are	a	representative	sample	of the	thick	terms	that	are	either	purely positive	or	purely	negative	(i. e.,	not	multivalent).	We	therefore	have good	reason	to	think	that	many	other	thick	terms	are	likely	to	exhibit similar	behavior.	In	particular,	it's	likely	that	many	other	positive	thick terms (e. g., 'loyal', 'chaste', 'wise', 'honest', etc.) are	also semantically associated	with	good in a way	and	that	many	negative	thick	terms	(e. g., 'lewd',	'rude',	'liar',	'dishonest',	'unkind',	etc.)	are	semantically	associated with	bad in a way.	The	number	of	thick	terms	to	which	the	Semantic View	applies	seems	to	expand	out	quite	significantly.	I	conclude,	then, that	we	have	good	reason	to	accept	the	Semantic	View	-	many	thick concepts,	if	not	all,	conceptually	entail	evaluative	concepts. The	Semantic	View,	as	I've	stated	it,	extends	to	many	thick	terms, although	I've	left	open	the	possibility	that it	might	not	extend	to	all. This	possibility	is	left	open	primarily	because	the	style	of	argument	I have	advanced	in	support	of	the	Semantic	View	may	not	apply	with respect	to	at	least	two	kinds	of	terms. First, consider slurs (e. g., 'kraut', 'gringo', 'tart', etc.). There is no consensus	about	whether	slurs	should	count	as	thick.	Some	ethicists, such	as	R.M.	Hare (1963,	25)	and	Mark	Richard	(2008, 14),	have	no qualms	about	including	them	among	the	thick.	Others,	like	Jonathan Dancy	(1995,	264)	and	Allan	Gibbard	(2003,	300ff),	are	hesitant.	Rather brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) regard	to	a	sizeable	group	of	thick	terms,	including	many	of	our	virtue and	vice	terms	(e.	g., 'courageous')	as	well	as	other	important	moral expressions	(e.	g., 'murder').	Now	that	I	have	presented	my	case	for the Semantic	View,	we can consider how	well this view stands up against	opposition. In	the	next	section, I	defend	the	Semantic	View against	the	most	recent	critique	by	Pekka	Väyrynen	stemming	from objectionable	thick	concepts. III. Objectionable Thick Concepts. Väyrynen	(2009)	has	argued	that	the	use	of	objectionable	thick	terms within	certain	contexts	sheds	light	on	the	question	of	how	thick	terms are associated with evaluations. And he thinks this data strongly suggests that these	evaluations	are	not	semantically	associated	with thick terms. But what are objectionable thick concepts? And how might	they	be	a	problem	for	the	Semantic	View? Very roughly, objectionable thick concepts are concepts that embody values that ought to be rejected. The concept lewd, for example, seems to embody the view that overt sexual behavior is somehow	bad.	But	many	people	believe this evaluative	perspective ought	to	be	rejected.	So,	it	appears	that	lewd	is	a	candidate	for	being	an objectionable	thick	concept.	In	effect,	the	question	of	whether	a	given thick concept actually is objectionable depends on the potentially controversial question	of	whether its associated values ought to be rejected.	So,	there's	much	room	for	debate	about	which	thick	concepts are actually objectionable. Concepts like lewd, chaste, blasphemous, and sexually perverse are commonly seen as paradigmatic examples, although	some	might	dispute	whether	these	are	really	objectionable. Nonetheless, speakers	who in fact reject the values embodied by a given	thick	concept	(whether	or	not	they	should)	tend	to	exhibit	some interesting linguistic	behavior.	For the	sake	of	simplicity, I'll refer to these	speakers	as	objectors. concept	conceptually	entails	both	good	in	a	way	and	bad	in	a	way.23 This	kind	of	multivalence	is	not	unprecedented:	if	liar	is	a	negatively evaluative	concept,	then	good	liar	would	likely	fit	this	mold	of	having both	positive	and	negative	evaluations	conceptually	encoded. It is	one	thing	to	show	that	the	Semantic	View	is	consistent	with multivalence,	but	it's	another	to	show	that	my	argument	for	the	Semantic View can be applied to	multivalent thick terms. And unfortunately, the argument	may	not apply, because the analogous linguistic data may	not	be	available	with	regard	to	some	multivalent	thick	terms.	For instance,	it	seems	felicitous	to	utter	'Max	is	unorthodox,	and	he's	not bad	in	any	way',	and	the	same	is	true	if	we	replace	'bad'	with	'good'.	If this	is	right,	then	the	type	of	argument	I	have	advanced	with	regard	to 'generous'	could	not	be	applied	to	'unorthodox'.	This	situation	may	not exist	for	all	multivalent	thick	terms,	but	it's	likely	to	be	more	prevalent among	them	because	our	usage	of	such	terms	may	not	typically	imply any	one	of	our	two	main	evaluative	concepts	-	good	in	way	and	bad in	a	way.	Thus,	it's	possible	that	the	type	of	argument	I	have	advanced would	not	apply	to	some	multivalent	thick	terms,	because	the	type	of linguistic	data	I	have	relied	on	is	not	available.	However,	just	as	with slurs,	I	do	not	deny	that	the	Semantic	View	is	true	of	multivalent	thick terms	-	I	only	claim	that	my	argument	does	not	clearly	demonstrate this	for	some	such	terms. In short, slurs and multivalent thick terms are two potential exceptions to the	Semantic	View.	There	may	be	others.	The	notion of	a	thick	term	is	not	well-defined	(as	illustrated	by	the	disagreement about whether slurs are thick). And so it isn't surprising that we find	importantly	different	classes	of	terms	grouped	together	as	thick. Nonetheless,	I	have	argued	that	the	Semantic	View	is	plausible	with 23.	One	attempt	at	explaining	the	phenomenon	of	multivalence	is	to	hold	that this	view is	not	merely	possible	but true.	This	would	not	explain	all types of	multivalence,	however, since it still needs to	be	explained	how the	use of some	multivalent thick terms	can lose	a	valence in	a	given	context.	For example,	some	uses	of	the	term	'kinky'	are	nothing	but	negative	and	carry	no positive	valence	whatsoever.	What	then	happens	to	the	positive	valence	in this	context?	This	is	different	from	the	behavior	of	'good	liar',	which	appears to	carry	both	evaluations	in	all	contexts. brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) The	basic	thought	behind	Väyrynen's	claim	is	this:	If	what	the	chastityobjector rejects is located within the truth-conditions of (24), then truth-conditional negation of (24) should be a perfectly acceptable way	of	expressing	her	disagreement	(Väyrynen	2009,	448).	This	basic thought is initially	attractive, and it	has	been	accepted	by	others	as well.	Matti	Eklund	(2011,	34)	makes	a	similar	point	about	objectionable thick	terms: ...[I]f	what	was	objectionable	about	the	value	words	was a	matter	of	truth-conditional	content,	then	one	could	well use the	words even if one finds them objectionable: it is	just	that	one	would	not	assert	of	anything	that	one	of these	words	applies	to	it. Eklund's claim	here is slightly	more	general than	VC,	but the same idea	lies	behind	them	both.	The	Semantic	View	seems	to	predict	that objectors	should	be	willing to	use	objectionable thick terms in	nonaffirmative	sentences,	like	(25). If	VC	were	correct,	it	would	spell	serious	trouble	for	the	Semantic View. As noted, chastity-objectors are not typically willing to apply truth-conditional	negation	to	(24).	In	other	words,	they	are	not	willing	to assert	(25).	But	this	datum,	in	combination	with	VC,	entails	that	(ceteris paribus) the evaluative content is not	part of the truth-conditions	of (24).26 Therefore,	it	doesn't	seem	that	the	Semantic	View	will	be	true	of 'chaste'.	Moreover,	Väyrynen	notes	that,	since	any	thick	concept	can,	in principle,	be	regarded	as	objectionable,	his	argument	will	apply	to	other thick	concepts	as	well	(2009,	449).	So,	Väyrynen's	argument	threatens to	pose	a	more	general	problem	for	the	Semantic	View. then	the	evaluative	content	"doesn't	seem	to	be"	part	of	the	truth-conditions of	'A	is	chaste'	(2009,	448). 26.	Technically	speaking,	this	argument	does	not	show	that	there	is	no	evaluative content	within	the	truth	conditions	of	'chaste',	but	only	that	the	one	rejected by	the	speaker	is	not	part	of	those	conditions.	But	for	all	that	matters,	there might	be	multiple	evaluative	contents	associated	with	'chaste'.	I	shall	ignore this	possibility	in	what	follows. Objectors	are	often	reluctant	to	use	the	thick	terms	they	regard	as objectionable.24 Of	course,	we	may	expect	that	someone	who	rejects the values embodied by chaste (i.	e., a chastity-objector) would be highly	reluctant	to	utter	an	affirmative	sentence	of	the	following	form: (24)	A	is	chaste. This	type	of	sentence	clearly	endorses	the	kind	of	values	rejected	by the chastity-objector. What is surprising, however, is that chastityobjectors	are	also	reluctant	to	utter	the	negation	of	(24)	-	namely (25)	A	is	not	chaste. Their unwillingness to assert (25) is initially puzzling, since it's plausible	that	chastity-objectors	should	take	(25) to	be	true. It looks as	if	these	negations	also	endorse	the	kind	of	values	rejected	by	the chastity-objector. Väyrynen	thinks	the	reluctance	of	chastity-objectors	to	assert	(25) presents	a	problem	for	the	Semantic	View.	In	particular,	he	advances the	following	claim,	which	I	shall	call	VC: VC: If	those	who	reject	the	evaluative	content	associated with chaste are not willing to apply truth-conditional negation to (24), then, ceteris paribus, that evaluative content	is	not	part	of	the	truth	conditions	of	(24).25 24. It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	some	people	will	be	reluctant	to	employ	certain thick terms even if they	wholly accept the associated values. For example, many	people	who	believe that	premarital sex is	wrong	would	nonetheless want	to	avoid	using	the	word	'fornicate'.	Something	similar	can	be	said	for	a host	of	thick	terms	like	'sacrilegious',	'holy',	'pure',	'defile',	'sinful',	'infidel',	'profane',	'heretical',	and	'heathen'.	But	the	unwillingness	of	objectors	to	use	these words	is	of	questionable	significance,	since	many	people	who	wholly	accept the	relevant	values	are	also	reluctant	to	use	them.	The	worry	is	that	certain paradigmatically	objectionable	thick	terms,	like 'chaste', 'blasphemous',	and 'perverse',	may	belong	in	this	category.	If	they	do,	then	their	significance	to this	discussion	would	be	questionable.	For	the	sake	of	argument,	however,	I will	assume	that	an	objector's	reluctance	is	different	in	kind	from	that	exhibited	by	wholehearted	believers	who	wish	to	avoid	'fornicate',	'defile',	etc. 25. I	add the	ceteris-paribus	clause	so	as to	weaken	VC in	a	way that	approximates	Väyrynen's	own	statement.	He	says	that,	if	the	antecedent	of	VC	is	true, brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) negative strengthening. That is, (25) implicates (26) in the same way that 'Smith is	not	happy' implicates 'Smith is	unhappy.' If these claims	are	correct,	then	a	chastity-objector	would	clearly	not	want	to assert	(25),	because	that	assertion	would	implicate	(26).	And	(26)	also embodies	a	value	that	she	rejects. Given	the	phenomenon	of	negative	strengthening,	we	can	make sense of the fact that 'A is not chaste' appears also to endorse the values that chastity-objectors reject. Very roughly, when negative strengthening	occurs, the	denial	of a	value	claim implicates	a	value on the opposite end of the same evaluative scale. But the objector in question is not someone who merely rejects one side of that evaluative	scale	-	she	rejects	the	entire	scale!	And	so,	this	speaker	will be	reluctant	to	utter	even	the	denial	of	the	original	value	claim. The	story	just	told	provides	reason	to	reject	VC,	because	it	explains the	objector's	reluctance	in	a	way	that	is	perfectly	consistent	with	the claim	that	the	evaluative	content	(rejected	by	the	chastity-objector)	is part	of	the	truth	conditions	of	(24).29 VC	must	therefore	be	rejected. between	something	she	most	likely	accepts	-	(25*)	-	and	something	she	outright	rejects	-	namely,	(26).	Moreover,	we	can	note	that	(26)	is	actually	the more	common	reading	of	(25),	which	suggests	that	someone	who	finds	chaste objectionable	would	withhold	uttering	(25)	without	further	clarifications. 29.	To	see	this,	consider	an	analogous	story involving 'right'.	Suppose	you're	a Mackie-style	error-theorist	about	rightness.	And	by	the	same	token,	you	also reject the	existence	of	wrongness.	Due to	your skepticism	about rightness, you	would	be	reluctant	to	utter	things	like (A)	Going	to	war	is	right. But	you	would	also	be	reluctant	to	apply	truth-conditional	negation	to	(A)	by asserting (B)	Going	to	war	is	not	right. After	all,	typical	utterances	of	this	sentence	strongly	imply (C)	Going	to	war	is	wrong. by	virtue	of	negative	strengthening.	But	your	reluctance	to	apply	truth-conditional	negation	to	(A)	can	be	given	the	same	kind	of	explanation	that	I've provided	with	regard	to	(24).	And	this	account	in	no	way	impugns	the	fairly But I think	VC is clearly	mistaken. It is important to notice that any	person	who	rejects	the	evaluative	content	associated	with	chaste will also reject at least one other evaluative content	-	namely the evaluative	content	associated	with	unchaste.27 But	Väyrynen	overlooks the possibility that a speaker's reluctance to assert (25)	might have something	to	do	with	her	reluctance	to	be	saddled	with	a	claim	about A's	being	unchaste.	In	particular,	notice	that (25)	A	is	not	chaste. clearly	seems	to	imply (26)	A	is	unchaste. This	kind	of	implication	is	what	linguists	call	"negative	strengthening" (Levinson	2000,	127).	Oftentimes,	when	'not'	is	combined	with	certain words, such as 'happy', 'believe', 'like', 'good', and 'bad', the speaker is	committed	to	something	stronger	than	what	she	literally	said.	For example,	if	I	utter,	'Smith	is	not	happy',	this	utterance	will	likely	convey the	stronger	claim	that	Smith	is	unhappy.	Linguists	typically	say	that claims like (25) and (26) are	not truth-conditionally equivalent, but that (25) implies (26)	by	virtue	of conversational implicature (Horn 1989,	331ff;	Levinson	2000,	127ff).	Let's	assume	this	is	true	for	present purposes.28 The	relationship	between	(25)	and	(26)	appears	to	exhibit 27. Since	chaste	and	unchaste	embody	the	same	general	evaluative	perspective,	any chastity-objector	who	does	not	also	reject	unchaste	would	seem	to	be	holding an	unintelligible	position.	Her	tendencies	about	asserting	claims	like	(24)	and (25)	should	therefore	not	be	taken	seriously	as	data	for	this	discussion. 28.	A	more	controversial	explanation	would rely	on the	claim that 'not' is	ambiguous.	Following	John	Lyons,	we	might	say	that,	on	some	occurrences,	'not' "converts	a	proposition	into	its	contradictory..."	(1977,	772).	On	this	reading, (25)	is	equivalent	to	the	following: (25*)	It's	not	the	case	that	Smith	is	chaste. However,	on	other	occurrences, 'not'	converts the	proposition	into its	"contrary". Since the contrary of 'chaste' is 'unchaste', this explains the connection	between	(25)	and	(26).	On	this	"contrary"	reading	of	'not',	(25)	is	actually equivalent	to	(26).	If	this	sort	of	view	is	correct,	then	we	can	explain	the	speaker's	reluctance	to	utter	(25)	by	citing	the	fact	that	this	utterance	is	ambiguous brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) And someone who thinks blasphemous is objectionable may not want	to	utter	(27),	for	fear	of	being	saddled	with	something	like	(28). Perhaps this explains Oscar Wilde's reluctance to utter (27) when faced	with	the	attorney's	aggressive	questioning:	"Did	you	or	did	you not	consider	the	story	blasphemous?"	(Wilde	and	Carson	1895).31 Of course, we may not always have an antonym, like 'reverent', corresponding to	each	potentially	objectionable thick term.	But this is	merely	a limitation	of	our language,	not	of	my	appeal to	negative strengthening. Some languages are even more limited. As Joseph Greenberg	observes,	certain	African,	Amerind,	and	Oceanic	languages have	no	word	for	'bad'.	Nonetheless,	speakers	in	these	languages	can convey	that	something	is	bad	by	negating	their	term	for	'good'	(1966, 52).	Their	way	of	expressing	that	A	is	not	good	implicates	that	A	is	bad, even	though	they	have	no	word	for	'bad'.	So,	negative	strengthening can	occur	even	if	we	don't	have	the	appropriate	antonym	to	express the	relevant	implicature. An	objection	may	arise	regarding	whether	my	appeal	to	negative strengthening over-generalizes. Väyrynen correctly notes that there are some contexts in which chastity-objectors would be willing to assert	'A	is	not	chaste'.	For	example, (29)	Smith	is	not	chaste,	but	neither	is	he	unchaste. (30)	Smith	is	not	chaste;	the	mere	fact	that	he's	dedicated	to	not being	sexually	provocative	does	not	make	him	good	in	any way. Does	my	appeal	to	negative	strengthening	incorrectly	predict	that	the chastity-objector	would	be	reluctant	to	assert	(29)	and	(30)?	No.	We can understand the follow-up clauses in (29) and (30) as elements that	cancel the	conversational implicature from 'Smith is	not	chaste' to 'Smith is	unchaste.'	The	cancelation is	obvious in (29), since that implicature	is	explicitly	denied	by	the	second	part	of	(29).	In	(30),	the implicature	is	not	explicitly	denied,	but	it's	plausible	that	the	follow-up 31. For	another	possible	explanation	of	Wilde's	reluctance,	see	footnote	24. It should	be	noted that	we could change	Väyrynen's example so that	we	focus	on	a	different	thick	concept	aside	from	chaste.	But	this will	not	reinstate	the	type	of	claim	he	wants	to	make.	To	be	sure,	with regard	to	some	thick	concepts,	it	is	less	obvious	what	implicature	gets generated	through	negative	strengthening.	For	example,	since	there's no such	word	as 'unblasphemous', it's not	wholly clear	what	would be	implicated	by	'A	is	not	blasphemous'.	However,	the	phenomenon of negative strengthening is not limited to expressions that can be prefixed	with	'un'.	For	example,	'good'	cannot	be	combined	with	that prefix,	but	an	utterance	of	'A	is	not	good'	tends	to	implicate	that	A	is bad.	And	it's	plausible	that	something	similar	is	true	for	'blasphemous'. An	utterance	of (27)	The	story	is	not	blasphemous. seems	to	imply	something	like (28)	The	story	is	somewhat	reverent.30 common view that (A) has an evaluative truth-condition. By analogy, the story	I've	told	about	chaste	is	also	consistent	with	claiming	that	(24)	has	an evaluative	truth-condition. 30.	The	adverb	'somewhat'	is	important,	due	to	an	asymmetry	in	the	way	positive and negative adjectives exhibit negative strengthening. Linguists typically acknowledge	that,	although	'A	is	not	happy'	clearly	implicates	'A	is	unhappy', the	analogous	implicature	is	not	generated	by	'A	is	not	unhappy'.	That	is, (i)	A	is	not	unhappy. does	not	straightforwardly	implicate (ii)	A	is	happy. However,	it	is	often	claimed	that	(i)	implicates	something	like (iii)	A	is	somewhat	happy	(though	not	quite	as	happy	as	the	word	'happy'	would	suggest). Levinson	(2000,	145)	and	Blutner	(2004,	500–1)	hold	this	type	of	view.	Analogous	claims	hold	for	negative	thick	terms	like	'blasphemous'	and	'unchaste'. The	central	point	here	is	that,	even	though	there	is	an	asymmetry	as	described, the	objectors	will	still	be	opposed	to	weaker	claims	like	(28). brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) true	due	to	a	false	antecedent.	So,	perhaps	Väyrynen's	argument	can be	refocused	on	conditionals	instead	of	negation. In	reply,	let	me	first	point	out	that	the	data	involving	conditionals	is much	less	secure	than	that	of	negation.	By	this,	I	mean	that	(i)	there	are significantly	fewer	contexts	in	which	chastity-objectors	would	exhibit any	reluctance	at	all,	and	(ii)	their	reluctance	in	those	contexts	would be	much	weaker. To illustrate (i), we can easily imagine a chastityobjector	playing	devil's	advocate	with	an	overly	pious	interlocutor.	In this case, the	objector	might feel	perfectly	comfortable	uttering (31), and	she	wouldn't	need to	utter	any follow-up	clauses to	qualify	her statement	(e. g.,	'...not	that	I	believe	in	chastity').	Regarding	(ii),	we	can imagine	a	chastity-objector	who	foregoes	the	opportunity	to	utter	(31) and	instead	replies,	'I	wouldn't	put	it	that	way,	but	I	guess	that	seems plausible.' This type of response illustrates a sort of reluctance that is	much	weaker	than	what	we	would	expect	with	regard	to	(25).	For these	reasons,	I	think	it	is	clear	that	the	data	involving	conditionals	is less	secure	than	that	of	negation. Nevertheless, in cases where objectors are reluctant to utter conditionals like (31),	how	can their reluctance	be	explained	by the Semantic	View?	Since	these	conditionals	do	not	involve	negation,	we obviously cannot appeal to negative strengthening. Nonetheless, a structurally	similar	explanation	is	available.	In	particular,	an	utterance of	(31)	in	many	contexts	seems	to	imply (32)	Abstinence from extramarital sex may be chaste, or it may	not. According	to	many	linguists	(e. g.,	Gazdar	1979,	59–62;	Levinson	1983, 137;	2000,	108–9),	the	relationship	between	sentences	like	(31)	and	(32) is	a	type	of	conversational	implicature	known	as	"clausal	implicature". By uttering the conditional 'if p, then q' (rather than the stronger alternative 'since p, q'), the speaker conveys epistemic uncertainty about whether the antecedent is true. The conditional clausally implicates	that	the	antecedent	'p'	may	or	may	not	be	true.	For	instance, according	to	Stephen	Levinson,	an	utterance	of	'If	there	is	life	on	Mars, clause	provides	enough	reason	to	doubt that the	speaker intends to convey	that	Smith	is	unchaste.	So,	the	problematic	implicature	is	not generated	by	(30).	Thus,	my	appeal	to	negative	strengthening	allows for	the	acceptability	of	(29)	and	(30)	to	chastity-objectors.32 Thus, it looks quite plausible that a speaker's reluctance to utter sentences like 'A is not chaste' in typical contexts is explainable through negative strengthening. And if that's so, then VC	must be rejected,	and	the	argument	against	the	Semantic	View	fails. Or is there an easy way in which Väyrynen can modify his argument? That argument focuses solely on the unwillingness of objectors to	utter	negations.	But	he	also	claims that "[c]onditionals exhibit	the	same	phenomenon".	In	particular,	he	thinks	that	objectors are typically unwilling to utter indicative conditionals whose antecedents contain objectionable thick terms. Väyrynen provides the	following	example	(2009,	448): (31) If abstinence from extramarital sex is chaste, then so is refraining	from	desiring	extramarital	sex. According	to	Väyrynen,	a	chastity-objector's reluctance	to	assert (31) would	be	initially	puzzling,	since	these	people	should	take	(31)	to	be 32. Väyrynen	tries	to	explain	the	fact	that	chastity-objectors	find	sentences	like (30)	to	be	acceptable	by	claiming	that	these	sentences	are	instances	of	metalinguistic	negation	(2009,	449).	See	Horn	(1989,	377)	for	an	account	of	metalinguistic	negation.	However,	if	(30)	can	be	seen	as	a	case	in	which	negative strengthening	is	canceled,	then	I	see	no	reason	to	postulate	that	(30)	is	metalinguistic.	Moreover,	it's	worth	pointing	out	that	(30)	fails	Horn's	incorporation	test	for	metalinguistic	negation	(1989,	392ff).	The	negation	in	'The	king of	France	is	not	happy,	because	there	is	no	king	of	France'	cannot	be	incorporated.	That is,	when 'not	happy' is replaced	with 'unhappy', the result is unintelligible:	#	'The	king	of	France	is	unhappy,	because	there	is	no	king	of France.'	But	nothing	similar	is	true	for	(30).	If	we	replace	'not	chaste'	in	(30) with	'unchaste',	the	result	is	not	the	least	bit	unintelligible: (30′)	Smith	is	unchaste;	the	mere	fact	that	he's	dedicated	to	not	being sexually	provocative	does	not	make	him	good	in	any	way. So, this	disparity is	prima facie	evidence	against taking (30) to	be	metalinguistic.	Of course,	Horn's incorporation test is not	uncontroversial.	Geurts (1998,	280)	is	one	critic. brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) and	unity,	but	let	me	briefly	say	why	the	proponent	of	the	Semantic View	does	not	falter	in	these	respects. Despite initial appearances, the	proposed	way	of explaining the reluctance	of	objectors	has	a	unified	base.	Both	clausal implicature and	negative	strengthening	are	forms	of	conversational implicature. These	inferences	are	therefore	based	on	the	addressee's	assumption that	the	speaker	is	following	certain	principles	of	conversation,	such as	Grice's	Cooperative	Principle	(Grice	1989,	26).	So,	the	unified	base underlying	the	proposed	explanation	is	this:	Objectors	are	reluctant to utter sentences like (25) and (31), as well as certain modals, disjunctions, and belief reports, because such utterances would conversationally	implicate	claims	that	objectors	want	to	avoid.	There is	no	clear	sense	in	which	this	explanation	lacks	unity,	and	so	I	think the	charge	is	unwarranted. It is also misguided to claim that the proposed explanation lacks simplicity. In appealing to negative strengthening and clausal implicature, the proponent of the Semantic	View is not postulating anything that rival views would not already postulate for more general	reasons.35	For	example,	it is	widely	accepted	that 'not	happy' conversationally	implicates	'unhappy'.	And,	once	this	view	is	granted, it	is	extremely	hard	to	deny	that	this	same	relation	also	holds	between 'not chaste' and 'unchaste'. So, even those	who reject the Semantic View	would	likely	accept	the	particular	pragmatic	relations	appealed to	by the	proponent	of the	Semantic	View.	Therefore, the	proposed explanation	involves	no	further	postulates,	and	is	no	less	simple,	than these	rival	views.36 35. Of course, the proponent of the Semantic View is postulating evaluative meanings,	which	rival	views	do	not	postulate.	But,	as	I	argued	in	section	II, these	are	not	postulated	beyond	necessity,	because	they	are	needed	for	explaining	the	infelicity	of	sentences	like	(3)–(5).	Moreover,	rival	views,	such	as that	of	Väyrynen	(2012),	tend	to	postulate	that	evaluations	project,	or	are	presupposed,	which	is	not	something	that	the	Semantic	View	needs	to	postulate. Thus,	the	two	views	initially	appear	to	be	on	par	with	regard	to	simplicity.	But see	footnote	36. 36. In	fact,	it	now	looks	like	the	charge	of	lacking	simplicity	can	be	turned	against rival views, such as Väyrynen's appeal to projection (see his 2012). Why the	NASA	budget	will	be	spared'	clausally implicates 'There	may	or may	not	be	life	on	Mars'	(2000,	36).	Assuming	this	is	correct,	we	are once	again	in	a	position	to	explain	the	chastity-objector's	reluctance by	way	of	conversational	implicature.	Chastity-objectors	are	likely	to take	issue	with	(32)	in	certain	contexts,	since	they	fail	to	believe	that abstinence	may	be	chaste.	And	since	(31)	conversationally	implicates (32),	they	would	be	reluctant	to	utter	(31)	in	those	contexts.33 Thus, Väyrynen's strategy	would fare no better if he focused on conditionals instead	of	negation. I should	also	note that the type	of explanation just	provided (vis-à-vis clausal implicature) can	also	be applied to disjunctive statements (e. g., 'Either Smith is chaste, or he's keeping secrets'), belief reports (e. g., 'The	Pope believes Smith is	chaste'),	as	well	as	modal	statements	(e. g.,	'It's	possible	that	Smith is not chaste') (Levinson 1983, 136–7; 2000, 108–11). For reasons similar to those	mentioned	earlier, I	believe the	data	with	regard to these statements is	much less secure. But, in contexts where there is reluctance, clausal implicature is a perfectly viable explanation. Disjunctions,	modals,	and	belief	reports	also	implicate	that	the	speaker is	uncertain	(e. g.,	about	whether	Smith	is	chaste),	and	this	is	something the	chastity-objector	would	want	to	avoid	in	certain	contexts. So	far,	I	have	argued	that	VC	is	false	and	that	it	cannot	be	salvaged through	appropriate	modification.	Proponents	of the	Semantic	View can appeal to pragmatic mechanisms	-	like negative strengthening and	clausal implicature	-	to	explain	an	objector's	reluctance	to	utter certain	sentences	involving	objectionable	thick	terms.	However,	even if	VC is	mistaken, it	might	be challenged that the	proponent	of the Semantic View is here appealing to an explanation that is inferior to	rival	explanations	because	it	seems	less	unified	and	less	simple.34 Space	prohibits	a	comparison	of	explanations	with	regard	to	simplicity 33.	Of	course,	the	contexts	in	which	objectors	are	reluctant	to	utter	(31)	would need	to	"line	up"	with	those	in	which	they	would	take	issue	with	(32),	but	I see	no	immediate	reason	to	think	that	won't	be	the	case. 34. Väyrynen	(2012)	briefly	advances	these	two	charges	against	my	view. brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 19 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) References Anscombe, G.E.M. 1958. 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. Philosophy 33: 1–19. Atlas, J.D. and S.C. Levinson. 1981. 'It-Clefts, Informativeness, and Logical	Form:	Radical	Pragmatics (Revised	Standard	Version)'. In Radical Pragmatics,	Peter	Cole,	ed.	New	York:	Academic	Press:	1–61. Bach,	K.	1999.	'The	Myth	of	Conventional	Implicature'.	Linguistics and Philosophy	22:	327–66. Blackburn, S. 1992. 'Through Thick and Thin'. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,	suppl.	vol.	66:	285–99. ---. 1998. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. Blutner, R. 2004. 'Pragmatics and the Lexicon'. In The Handbook of Pragmatics, L.R.	Horn	and	G.	Ward,	eds.	Oxford:	Blackwell:	488–514. Brower,	B.W.	1988.	'Virtue	Concepts	and	Ethical	Realism'.	The Journal of Philosophy	85:	675–93. Chierchia,	G.	and	S.	McConnell-Ginet.	1990.	Meaning and Grammar: An Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge,	Mass:	MIT	Press. Dancy, J. 1995. 'In Defense of Thick Concepts'. Midwest Studies in Philosophy	20:	263–79. Eklund,	M.	2011. 'What	Are	Thick	Concepts?'	The Canadian Journal of Philosophy	41:	25–50. Foot,	P.	1958.	'Moral	Arguments.'	Mind	67:	502–13. Gazdar,	G.	1979.	Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition, and Logical Form. New	York:	Academic	Press. Geurts,	B.	1998.	'The	Mechanisms	of	Denial'.	Language	74:	274–307. Gibbard,	A.	2003. 'Reasons	Thin	and	Thick'.	The Journal of Philosophy 100:	288–304. Greenberg,	J.H.	1966.	Language Universals.	The	Hague:	Mouton	and	Co. Grice,	P.	1989.	Studies in the Way of Words.	Cambridge,	Mass:	Harvard University	Press. indebted	to	Nicholas	Silins,	Carl	Ginet,	Kent	Dunnington,	Nicholas	Sturgeon, and	the	referees	for	Philosophers' Imprint. IV. Conclusion. This	paper	has	run	the	gamut	of	possible	views	on	how	thick	terms might	be associated	with	evaluations. I have	argued for a	Semantic View,	according	to	which	many	(if	not	all)	thick	concepts	conceptually entail	evaluative	contents.37 In	section	II,	it	was	argued	that	this	view best	explains	certain	data	involving	thick	terms	and	expressions	like 'good	in	a	way'	and	'bad	in	a	way'.	A	number	of	rival	hypotheses	were shown	unable	to	explain	this	data. The Semantic View, however, has a number of detractors, and I addressed	the	most	recent	of	them	in	section	III.	It	was	argued	that	the considerations	raised	by	objectionable	thick	concepts	do	not	supply	a compelling	case	against	the	Semantic	View. If I am correct in holding that thick terms bear a semantic relationship to	evaluations, then	this	settles	a	dispute that is	central to a broader debate in ethics. In particular, a number of ethicists have	dismissed the importance	of thick concepts	within	ethics, and they	have	done	so	by	claiming	that	thick	terms	are	not	semantically associated with evaluations. But if my argument in this paper is correct, then this claim is mistaken and therefore does not permit ethicists to	overlook	the	thick. It is	highly	plausible	that thick	terms are	associated	with	evaluations	in	a	way	similar	to	how	thin	terms	are commonly	thought	to	be	associated	with	evaluations.	Thick	terms	are semantically	evaluative.38 should	we	seek	additional	resources,	like	projection	-	on	top	of	what's	already available	with	negative	strengthening	and	clausal	implicature	-	for	explaining the	linguistic	behavior	of	objectors?	The	answer	is	by	no	means	obvious. 37. Recall	that	footnote	1	provides	a	modified	version	of	the	Semantic	View	that does	not	assume	a	distinction	between	evaluative	and	non-evaluative content.	The	modified	view	holds	that	thick	concepts	conceptually	entail	the	contents	expressed	by	thin	terms,	and	this	modified	view	is	equally	supported	by the	arguments	in	this	paper. 38.	An	early	version	of	this	paper	was	distributed	within	a	dissertation	writing group	at	Cornell	University;	many thanks to its participants for their feedback	-	Scott	O'Connor,	Kristen Inglis,	Colin	McLear, and	Andrew	Alwood. My gratitude especially goes to Matti Eklund for his advice, comments, and	willingness to	discuss	many	different	versions	of this	paper. I	am	also brent	g.	kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative? philosophers'	imprint – 20 – vol.	13,	no.	1	(january	2013) Sadock,	J.	1978.	'On	Testing	for	Conversational	Implicature'.	In	Syntax and Semantics, vol. 9: Pragmatics, P.	Cole,	ed.	New	York:	Academic Press:	281–97. Stalnaker,	R.	1970.	'Pragmatics'.	Synthese	22:	272–89. Stanley,	J.	and	Z.G.	Szabó.	2000.	'On	Quantifier	Domain	Restriction'. Mind & Language	15:	219–61. Thomson,	J.J.	2008 .	Normativity.	Chicago:	Open	Court. Väyrynen, P. 2009. 'Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials'. Philosophical Perspectives: Ethics	23:	439–69. ---. 2011. 'Thick Concepts and Variability'. Philosophers' Imprint 11: 1–17. ---. 2012. 'Thick Concepts: Where's Evaluation?' Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics	7,	R.	Shafer-Landau,	ed.	Oxford:	Oxford University	Press. Ward,	G.L.	1988.	The Semantics and Pragmatics of Preposing.	New	York: Garland	Publishing. Wilde,	O. and	E.	Carson. 1895. 'Testimony	of	Oscar	Wilde	on	Cross Examination'. http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/ wilde/wildelibeltranowcross.html.	Accessed	June	8,	2010. Williams,	B.	1985.	Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.	Cambridge,	Mass: Harvard	University	Press. ---.	1995.	'Truth	in	Ethics'.	Ratio	8:	227–42. Williamson,	T.	2007.	The Philosophy of Philosophy.	Oxford:	Blackwell. Wilson, D. 1975. Presuppositions and Non-Truth-Conditional Semantics. New	York:	Academic	Press. Hare,	R.M.	1963.	Freedom and Reason.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Horn,	L.R.	1989.	A Natural History of Negation.	Chicago:	University	of Chicago	Press. ---.	1991.	'Given	as	New:	When	Redundant	Affirmation	Isn't'.	Journal of Pragmatics	15:	313–36. Huang,	Y.	2007.	Pragmatics.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Hursthouse, R. 1995. 'Normative Virtue Ethics'. In How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues, R.	Crisp,	ed.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press:	19–36. Jackson, F. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Levinson,	S.C.	1983.	Pragmatics.	Cambridge,	UK:	Cambridge	University Press. ---. 2000. Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature.	Cambridge,	Mass:	MIT	Press. Lovibond, S. 1983. Realism and Imagination in Ethics. Minneapolis: University	of	Minnesota	Press. Lyons, J. 1977. Semantics: Volume 1. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University	Press. McDowell, J. 1981. 'Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following'. In Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule,	S.	Holtzman	and	C.	Leich,	eds.	London: Routledge. Millgram, E. 1995. 'Inhaltsreiche ethische Begriffe und die Unterscheidung zwischen Tatsachen und Werten'. In Zum moralischen Denken	vol.	1,	C.	Fehige	and	G.	Meggle,	eds.	Frankfurt	a. M.:	Suhrkamp:	354–88. Murdoch,	I.	1971.	The Sovereignty of Good.	New	York:	Schocken. Platts, M. 1979. Ways of Meaning: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Language.	Cambridge,	Mass:	MIT	Press. Potts, C. 2007. 'Into the Conventional-Implicature Dimension'. Philosophy Compass 2:	665–79. Richard,	M. 2008.	When Truth Gives Out.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press.